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TELEVISING AND BROADCASTING TRIALS
Paul J. Yesawkh, Jr.*
The novelty of television is beginning to wear thin but in the wake
of its birth flows a renewed interest in an unceasing conflict between
the press and the courts. Its potential utility as a medium of information
and education has many interesting facets, not the least of which is its
use to transmit to the public scenes of legislative investigations and trials.
The full impact of television, as an appendage of a legislative inquiry,
was demonstrated by the Special Senate Committee to Investigate
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. Its use by that Committee
has provoked a seemingly endless stream of comment both from the
press and the bar.1 In the Senate, its use was the subject of a spirited
debate' while in the House of Representatives it was the precursor of
a ruling by Speaker Rayburn which bars television and radio reporting
* See Contributor's Section, Masthead, p. 718, for biographical data.
1 E.g., Gossett, Justice and TV, 38 A.B.A.J. 15 (1952); Arnold, Mob Justice and

Television, 12 FED. Coar. B.J. 4 (1951); Taylor, The Issue Is Not TV, But Fair Play,
12 FED. Coma. B. 1. 10 (1951); Charnley, Should Courtroom Proceedings Be Broadcast?,
11 FED. Com. B. J. 64 (1950); State Legislation Affecting Radio and Television in 1949,
10 FED. Com. B. J. 208 (1949); 10 See Magazine 28 (November 1951); Klots, Trial by
Television, 203 Harper's 90 (October 1951); Time, April 16, 1951, p. 57, col. 1; U.S.
News & World Report, March 30, 1951, p. 60, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 7, 1952, p. 12,
col. 2; N.Y. Times, March 3, 1952, p. 28, col. 6; N.Y. Times, March 2, 1952, p. 2E,
col. 8, and p. 7E, col. 5; N.Y. Times, March 1, 1952, p. 13, col. 4, p. 14, col. 7, and
p. 32, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1952, p. 32, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1952, p. 22,
col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb 26, 1952, p. 1, col 2, p. 1, col. 4, and p. 14, col. 2; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1952, p. 27, col. 1; N.Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 1952, p. 504, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1952, p. 10E, col. 3; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 26, 1952, p. 7, col. 6; N.Y. HMerald
Tribune, Jan. 16, 1952, p. 12, col. 3; N.Y. Times Magazine, Jan. 13, 1952, p. 12; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 12, 1952, p. 15, col. 5; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 21, 1951, p. 21, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1951, p. 48, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1951, p. 28, col. 7;
N.Y. Herald Tribune, Sept. 12, 1951, p. 4, col. 3; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Sept. 7, 1951,
p. 17, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1951, p. 7, col. 2; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Aug. 12,
1951, p. 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1951, p. 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 24, 1951,
a series of articles begun by Jack Gould; N.Y. Times, June 19, 1951, p. 31, col. 5;
The Washington Post, June 9, 1951, p. 6, col. 1; The -Detroit News, April 1, 1951, p. 15,
col. 1; The N.Y. Post, March 27, 1951, a series of articles begun by Max Lerner; Tim
CAmRic~w
BAR AssociATION: REPORT Or Coiacam= ON TEEIVSING AN BRoADCAsTING
A
_Ax
LEGISrATIVE AND JUDICIA. PROCEEDINGS (February 11, 1952) and 62 REPORTS OF Aw

BAR AssocIATION 851 (1937); THE AssoCIATIOx Or Thm BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw
YoPx: REPORT ON RADIO AND TEL ISION BROADCAST1NG OF HEARINGS OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS (January 15, 1952) and REPORT ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1948).
2 97 CONG. REC. 9976 et seq. (August 10, 1951). The diversity of Congressional opinion
on this subject is also reflected in various bills and resolutions. Compare for example
H.R. 1017, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) with S.C. RES. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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of House Committee hearings? In the state legislatures, the phenomenon
of a televised legislative investigation has evoked little responsible action
other than in California where the legislature provided that no hearing
held by a special crime study commission would be televised or broadcast
by radio.'
The problems inherent in the televising of congressional inquisitorial
investigations are beyond the bounds of this paper. In passing, however,
it is well to note that unlike judicial proceedings there may be, in some
instances, a legitimate need for the legislature in its informing function
to educate and alert the public by placing before it, through the medium
3 See N.Y. Times, February 26, 1952, p. 1, col. 4 and N.Y. Herald Tribune, February
26, 1952, p. 4, col. 3. Mr. Rayburn's ruling applied to newsreels and motion pictures of
a hearing for later showing by television as well as to tape recordings for later broadcasts
but still photographs were excluded from the ban.
4 Statutes and Amendments to the Code of California 1951, Vol. 1, c. 902, p. 2428.
State legislative activity in the field of television has generally been of a more prosaic
character although many of the states have concerned themselves with the problem of
defamation. See the following: ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 370, tit. 36, § 58(35) (Supp. 1951) ;
Aax. CODE ANN. § 66-182c (Supp. 1951) ; CAL.. Cvn CODE § 48.5 (Deering 1949), 1 Business and Professions Code § 7234 (Deering 1951), CCH ADvANCE SEss. LAws-Cal. 1951;
CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 138 B, § 1, c. 16, § 233 (1935); CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 498b (Supp.
1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.04 (Supp. 1951), CCH ADvANCE SEss. LAwS-Fla. 1951; GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 105-712 to 105-714 (Supp. 1951) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §§ 404.1 to 404.4
(Smith-Hurd 1936), CCH ADVANCE SEss. LAws-Ill. 1951; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-518, § 2-519,
§ 2-1733, §§ 47-2239 to 47-2240, § 64-750 (Burns 1933) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 9 60-746a
(Cum. Supp. 1949); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 50 and 203, tit. 33, § 4161, tit. 45 §§ 1351 to
1354 (1950) ; Me. Laws 1949, c. 12, § 33A, c. 134, § 31A, CCH ADVANCE Sass. LAWS-Me.
1951; Md. Laws 1949, c. 137, § 226A, c. 614, § 1; MAsS. ANN. LAWS c. 90, § 13 (1947),
CCH ADvANCE Sass. LAws-Mass. 1951; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 4.156(1), §§ 27.1405 to 27.1406,
§ 28.776(1) (1937); MIEN. STAT. ANN. § 484.19, § 544.043 (Supp. 1951); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 93-601-902, § 94-2807 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-601 to 86-603 (Supp.
1949), CCH ADVANCE SEss. LAws--Neb. 1951; CCH ADVANCE SEss. LAWS-Nev. 1951;
N.H. Laws 1949, c. 45, §6A, CCH ADVANCE Sass. LAws-N.H. 1951; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§5:2-12, §54:40A-44 (1940), N.J. SEssIoN LAW SERVICE 1951, No. 3, p. 244; N.Y.
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 15(24), N.Y. PENAL CODE § 485, 485-A, N.Y. UNCONSOLIDATED
LAWS § 9127, N.Y. MrLTLE DWELLING LAW § 62; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-136.1,
§§ 143 to 274 (1943), N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 99-1, 99-2, 99-5 (1950); Omo GEN. CODE
ANN. § 12600-2 (Page Supp. 1951), CCH ADVANCE SEss. LAWs--Ohio 1951; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 147.1, 147.2 (1950), CCH ADVANCE SESs. LAWS-Okla. 1951; ORE. Com..
LAWS ANN. § 1-909a (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4413.1, tit. 47, § 744-602(14), tit. 75,
§403c (Purdon 1940); R.I. Acts and Resolves 1950 c. 2611, p. 729, R.I. Acts and
Resolves 1949 c. 2298, p. 437; S.D. Laws 1949 c. 206, pp. 245, 250; TEx. REV. CrvIi
STAT. ANN. art. 70471, § 1/2 (Vernon 1951), Tax. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 667-24a, § 1 (Vernon
1951), TEx. ANN. STAT. SERVICE, NEW ELECTON CODE art. 246 (Vernon 1952); UTAr CODE
ANN. § 104-11-13 (1943); Laws of Vt. 1949, No. 248, p. 227; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-632.1,
§ 46-219.1, §§ 58-266.1 to 58-266.3 (1950); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6360-98d (Remington
Supp. 1949); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1721 (446) (42) (1949); Wisc. STAT. § 12.14, § 12.15,
§ 85.34 (4), § 348.412 (1949), CCH ADVANCE Sass. LAWS--Wisc. 19511 Wyo. Coup. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3-7901 to 3-7903 (1945).
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of television, information uncovered during legislative investigations.
Public legislative hearings, frequently the forerunners of significant legislation, often stimulate informed civic interest and expression on controversial legislation which is helpful to the legislators as well as the country
as a whole. This educational or informational need, nevertheless, must
be carefully weighed against the scope and immediacy with which television can circulate injury to the reputation and property of those persons
drawn even incidentally within the compass of the investigations. The
balance of interests becomes less acute when interrogating legislators
succumb to an unfortunate temptation to appear in the combined function
of prosecutors and judges. As the legislators yield, the investigation
takes on the aspect of a Grand Jury proceeding or is converted into a
trial without regard for those rights, limited though they may be, of the
attending witnesses.5 The ensuing injury to these witnesses, which so
often occurs, outweighs the necessity for informed public opinion.
But whatever justification there may be for televising legislative
inquiries,6 there is little or no justification for televising trials. The
telecasters' and broadcasters' prevailing desire to publicize trials by
audio-visual or sound registering devices is a continued extension of a
recurring problem which has never been satisfactorily resolved. The
press, zealously guarding its freedom of expression, and the bar, safeguarding the integrity of the court and the rights of the participants at
trials, have been unable to agree on the role of the press and radio in
criminal trials.7 What little experience there is to draw upon indicates
a necessity for the containment of the press within its proper sphere.
5 Judge Samuel S. Leibowitz, speaking at the Yale Law School said of the recent

televised congressional investigations that:
many witnesses . . . were in a very real sense defendants before the bar of public
opinion . . . The witnesses were defending their actions and accounting for their
conduct just as certainly as if they were being tried upon indictments. And they
were doing so before a jury of literally millions of their peers. (March 20, 1951).
6 See the MINoRTY REPORT OF =a ComfrsraE ON T= BILL OF RIGHTS or TnE AssoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY Or NEw YoRy ON RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING
OF HEARINGS OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (January 15, 1952). Even Senator Kefauver, an understandable exponent of television, is opposed to television in the courts.
The Senator has stated his opposition on the record:
The public does not get any particular educational value from a [broadcast or
televised] court proceeding. I have a great deal of doubt as to whether or not the
use of radio and television broadcasting ought to be used in court proceedings. I
would feel that they should not be. 97 CONG. REc. 10001 (August 10, 1951)
7 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CoM3aITTEE ON COOPERATION BETwEEN PRESS, RADIO AND BAR,
AS TO PUBLICITY INTERFERING WITH FAIR TRIAL OF JUDICIAL AND QuASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGs. 62 REPORTS OF AmERIcAN BAR AssoCIATIoN 851 (1937). For an excellent collection
of materials on the responsibility of the press during pending litigation see Vol. 6, THE
RECORD or THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF TE CITY or NEW YORK 429 (December 1951).
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The possible intrusion of television cameras into the courtroom is no
longer in the region of speculation. Telecasters have already invaded
the courts, with relative impunity, to transmit to the public scenes of
murder trials. In one reported instance the court although assuming
"that it was improper to allow the taking of news photographs or televising of scenes in the courtroom" manifested that this impropriety unaccompanied by some other deficiency in the proceedings is not violative
of the requirement of a fair trial.' Unless a sharper judicial reprimand
than this is forthcoming, there is little reason to expect that telecasters
will, in the future, burden themselves with restraint, especially in the
presence of the cause celebre or a sordid murder trial.
Television, because of its newness, provides little precedent helpful
in restricting the enlivened propensity for ever-increasing trial publicity.
Yet its hybrid character lends itself readily to the principles applied on
those occasions when the courts have been required to contend with the
presence of the enterprising radio broadcaster or photographer. Radio
broadcasts and photographs of judicial proceedings, in fact, are not
infrequent. It is sometimes asserted that the right to employ these devices
during the proceedings is an integral part of the freedom of the press.9
Telecasters, like broadcasters and news photographers, stressing their
capacity as representatives of the press will urge that they "have a right
to attend and report trials of persons accused of crime, which are public
proceedings, and that photographic portrayals of the trial scenes, if
obtained without disturbance, are as legally permissible as verbal descrip10
tions.2
While criminal trials are public proceedings it is doubtful whether
the public has anything akin to a right of attendance at such trials. 1
The Sixth Amendment grants to the accused the privilege of a public
8 People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P. 2d 330 (1951), aff'd, 12 CCH U.S. SuP. CT.
BuLL. 879 (1952). But note the dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., at page 895. There have
been other instances, although unreported, in which judicial proceedings have been televised.
See Charnley, Skoidd Courtroom Proceedings Be Broadcast? 11 FED. Cowe. B. J. 64 (1950).
9 Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. City of Asbury Park, 20 U. S.L. WEEx 2154 (N. J., October
23, 1951); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
10 Ez parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312, 315 (1927); Noted, 12 CoRNExL L.Q. 374
(1927); Also discussed in THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF Tn Press 423 et seq. (1944).
11 Cf. Dawson, Broadcast Trials? Yes, CASE AND COMEENT (Nov. 1937) at page 8 et seq.,
where the author writes:
The public itself in democratic courts has acquired something in the nature of a
vested interest in criminal trials. The rule that such cases should be tried in public
did not orginate out of any concern for the accused . . . the right of the accused to a
public trial is not mentioned either in the Magna Charta or in the English Bill of
Rights. It seems to have developed as a by-product of the publicity naturally attendant
on trial by jury....
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trial, but there is no comparable constitutional grant to the public making their attendance mandatory upon the court or the parties. It seems
rather that the requirement of a public trial was created for the benefit
of the accused, so that the public might see that he was fairly dealt
with and not unjustly condemned.12 Its object was to insure the accused
from the corrupt practices and miscarriages of justice perpetrated by
those secret tribunals which in the past, as well as in certain corners
3
of the world today, have been so effective as instruments of. oppression
Since a public trial is the accused's privilege and not the right of the
pruriently curious, the alleged need for the attendance of the public or
its information media is dissipated when the accused declines to exercise
this privilege. Consequently, if the accused is willing to place his confidence in the judiciary and in counsel and if he is willing to waive his
constitutional privilege,' 4 he should be allowed to exclude the intrusion
of the public and its information media since their reason for admission
is based on the then non-existent necessity of his protection. The intrinsic
difficulty in this approach is an understandable reluctance on the part
of the courts to override even a vague constitutional right, especially
when that right is one which is presumably rooted in the protective
desire of the public generally to secure the impartial administration of
justice. But this reluctance can be dispelled-by the fact that the requirement of a public trial was created and satisfied when there were no
broadcasters or telecasters'3 and few newspapers. Trials have been
public from antiquity without television and they will be no less public
today if television is denied access to the courts.
Then, too, the word "public" is a flexible one with an elasticity of
definitions best illustrated by those instances where the courts preclude
from the courtroom a disturbing public. 16 Extended to its logical and
ridiculous extreme, it might necessitate the construction of auditoriums
and amphitheaters for judicial purposes, or as Thurman Arnold has
12 It may be argued that the very edstence of the accused's constitutional privilege to
a public trial implicitly incorporates the proposition that private trials are acceptable
unless the accused invokes his privilege.
"AN,
13 1 CooLEY's CONSTITUTIONAL LITATIONS, c. 10, p. 647 (8th ed. 1927); 1 TI
STATE & FEDERAL CONTROL or PERsoNs AND PROPERTY 104-106 (1900); 2 TUCKER, ON THE
CONSTriUTION 679 (1899).
14 United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868,
rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 896 (1949); 14 Am. JuR. § 143, p. 869 (1938); 23 C.J.S.

§ 963, p. 289 (1940).
15 Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEmp. L. Q. 381 (1932) ; Note, 36 MICH. L.
REV. 1386 (1938).

16 Note, 156 A.L.R. 265 (1945).
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written of a trial like that of Alger Hiss it might require that the proceed7
ings be transferred to Yankee Stadium.'
Whether the telecasters can bring their medium within the purview
of the term "public" as it incorporates the press is an issue often
contemplated. To some, television like motion pictures, is a vehicle of
entertainment and not a news agency."8 Such was the intimation in Earle
C. Anthony, Inc. v. Morrison where the court said:
It may be some day that broadcasting and television may be considered
a vested right of news gathering agencies but the flexibility of my mind
cannot comprehend that such unusual privileges have thus far jelled into
a right. 19

An auxiliary prop for this position, and one not to be easily discounted,
is the ability of an astute television cameraman to heighten the dramatic
intensity of a trial or to effectuate a commentary on the character of
witnesses or parties by his camera direction, all of which indicates that
the transmitted effect can be primarily one of entertainment, depending
upon the whim of a cameraman. 0
On the other hand telecasters may take comfort in the view that since
television gives a pictorial representation of events as they occur it more
nearly approaches a news agency than entertainment.2 ' To them television or "electronic journalism" is the most efficient form of reporting and
17 Arnold, Mob Justice and Television, 12 FED. Com.
B. J. 4 (1951). A more realistic
approach was taken in People v. Stanley, 33 Cal. App. 624, 166 Pac. 596, 598 (1917)
where the court said:
The provision of the Constitution with respect to the right of accused persons to
a public trial must be construed in a reasonable sense in view of the object to be
subserved thereby, and is not to be interpreted as intended that the trial of criminal
cases shall be held in places so large or so open as that the entire body of the
public of a city or region may attend it if they so desire....
18 People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32, 117 N.E. 286 (117), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 638
(1920); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665 (1951),
rev'd, 20'U.S.L. WEEK 4329 (U.S. May 27, 1952); Note, 37 VA. L. Rav. 335 (1951).
19 83 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd mernm., 173 F. 2d 897, Case 2 (9th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 819 (1949).
20 Printers Ink, Vol. 235, pp. 933, 935 (April 20, 1951). Perhaps too, the use of television
in this manner is somewhat analogous to those instances where the courts have found the open
and public shadowing of a person by private detectives an actionable wrong. Schultz v.
Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate G. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913); Note,
138 A.L.R. 22, 93 (1942). See also the language in Monson v. Tussauds Ltd., 1 Q.B.
671 (1894) and the suggestions of Mr. Solinger in Fortune, pp. 161, 162 (December, 1948).
21 See the conclusions of law in Dumont v. Carroll, 86 F. Supp. 813 (E. D. Pa. 1949),
aff'd, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951), set forth in the
MiNopIr REPORT OF THE COMmTTEE ON THE BiLL OF RIGHTS OF THE AssociATioN OF Tm
=a CITY oF Naw YoRx ON RADIO Am TELEvIsION BROADCASTING or HEAR3NGS
BAR or
oF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (January 15, 1952).
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is the epitome of press representation. To them the Supreme Court has
extended the imprimatur of its dictum declaring:
We have no doubt that motion pictures, like newspapers and radio,
are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
But it is the function of a trial which is determinative of the constraint
which should be imposed upon the telecaster. A trial should consist
only of a sober investigation of the matters in issue.' It is a central
part of our judicial machinery and its undisturbed functioning is of the
most solemn concern to the interested parties. It is a happening not to
be lightly regarded as a means of entertainment or in any sense a festive
occasion.' Yet, cameramen and radio operators often beset the courts
for an admittance, which is frequently bestowed, notwithstanding their
tendency to convert a courtroom into a picture gallery or the trial of a
case into a show. The use of television, radio or similar apparatus during
a trial distracts from the singular purpose of the courts and subverts
the dignity of their proceedings.
The introduction into the courtroom of cameras and microphones and
the accompanying necessity that the participants in the proceedings consciously adapt themselves to these devices 3 is a serious departure from
22 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). Because the Paramount case was an antitrust action and freedom of speech was not involved, the decision
in Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. City of Asbury Park, 20 U.S. L. WEEx 2154 (N.J., October
23, 1951) is more in point. There the Superior Court of New Jersey ordered the City of
Asbury Park to allow a radio station to broadcast public hearings on a proposed city tax.
The court in its decision said:
I find as a fact . . . that the exclusion of a radio news broadcast of the public
hearing tomorrow would be a violation of the Federal and State Constitutional rights
guaranteed to the press. I find further that radio news broadcasting is, by definition
of this court "press" under the Constitutional provisions.
23 In a broadcast over station WNYC, New York City, the Honorable Simon H.
Rifkind said:
The functon of a trial is not to inform, to educate, to edify, or entertain the publiq.
The function of trials in our system of justice is to maintain the peace without violence,
by affording people a forum where they can peacefully adjust their differences. The
function of trials is to settle controversies so that the people can go forward and
attend their business and go on to the next proposition. The function of trials is to
resolve issues between citizens, to resolve controversies between citizens and their
government-that is the end product of the judicial trial. We say-in an overall
phrase--we say it is intended to promote justice. (June 18, 1951).
24 Bisignano v. Municipal Court of Des Moines, 237 Ia. 895, 23 N.W. 2d 523 (1946),
cert. denied, 330 U. S.818 (1946); People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32, 117 N.E. 286 (1917),
cert. denied, 254 U.S. 638 (1920).
25 The Special Committee on Cooperation between Press, Radio and Bar of the
American Bar Association reported:
It is, however, quite clear that all mechanisms which require the participants in a trial
consciously to adapt themselves to the exigencies of recording and reproducing devices
distract attention which ought to be concentrated upon the single object of promoting
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those rules which have been fashioned by experience to insure the orderly
and serious quest for truth. Unless there is some real benefit to the
participants in having a trial televised such a departure must be condemned. The advantages, however, of a telecast trial are out-sized by
the disadvantages. For example, the suggestion that the quality of testi.
mony will necessarily be improved2 6 with increased publicity is somewhat
unrealistic in view of the not uncommon tendency for the criminally
inclined to dramatize or romanticize their lives." And again, while the
realization that a vast unseen audience is present may arouse in some a
conscientious awareness of their responsibilities, in others it may stimulate a demoralizing insistence for histrionics. It is difficult to conceive
how a calm, deliberate and unemotional inquiry can be had when the
courtroom is filled with a confusion of microphones and cameras and
the prevading sense of an invisible gallery.
Nor is the education of the public a function or a salutary by-product
of a televised trial.' The experience of radio and photography cases
has shown, and certain of our current periodicals persist in showing,
that the more sordid crimes are given the most expansive coverage. It is
the gruesome murder or the confidential divorce which is most likely
to be considered readily entertaining to a morbidly curious segment of
the viewing public.' To televise such proceedings is merely to aid in
justice. Experience has quite clearly demonstrated that even in the much simpler
matter of public speaking, radio addresses and addresses to an audience which
confronts the speaker are very different things requiring different techniques. Quite
obviously the attention of lawyers and witnesses ought to be concentrated upon the
jury who are to determine the tragic fact of guilt or innocence and ought not to be
divided between the jury and an air audience who for the most part have no real
interest in the proceedings but are listening in to get a thrill out of a pitiful and
sordid tale. It is too much to hope that lawyers and witnesses can do their full duty
by the court and at the same time be effective factors in the highly specialized art
of broadcast drama.
62 REPORTS Or AraNc:r BAR AssociTioN 851, 864 (1937). See also People v. Ulich,
376 Ill. 461, 34 N.E. 2d 393 (1941) where a photographer had the jury arrange itself in a
special position so that they might be photographed; and Professor Charnley's article in
11 FEn. Coi. BJ. 64, 68 where he reports that a judge delayed a broadcast of a motion
two minutes so that program changes could be made to accommodate the broadcast. For
an indication of how other courts may react to the necessity of gearing their proceedings
so as to conserve time for a radio broadcast or telecast see Brody v. Owen, 18 N.Y.S. 2d.
28, 259 App. Div. 720 (2d Dep't 1940), In re Blake, 17 N.Y. S. 2d 496 (Sup,. Ct. Kings
County 1939); 26 A.B.A.J. 185 (1940), and the opinion of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances in 22 A.B.A. J. 836, 837 (1936).
26 6 WIcmoRE, EviDENcE § 1834 et seq., p. 332 (3d ed. 1940), and Banrrr
: RATIONALE
or JuniciAL EvinEc, c. 10, §§ 2 and 3, pp. 522 et seq.
27 Note, 17 ORE. L. REv. 139 (1938). It is not unusual these days to read in the daily
papers that people are vying for the opportunity to publish the memoirs of known criminals.
28 Radin, The Right To A Public Trial, 6 TEmn. L.Q. 381, 384 (1932).
29 People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951), aff'd, CCH U.S. Sup. Cr. BULL.
879 (1952) (telecast of murder trial) ; Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127 (1938)
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the dissemination of that undesirable publicity which may well foster
the corruption of an already waivering public morality.
From the viewpoint of the accused during the trial, to be under the
surveillance of the selective yet ubiquitous eye of a television camera,
is, to say the least, a mentally discomforting imposition. The pressure
of "mike fright" and "stage fright" will unduly hamper the testimony
of many witnesses already under a severe mental and physical strain. 0
To be brought within the precincts of a court to stand trial is an ordeal
in itself and there is neither need nor right to intensify this humiliation
by a compulsory submission to a telecast. The freedom of the press
grants no such license, for the liberty of the press does not include the
privilege of taking advantage of a person accused of crime to photograph
his face and figure against his will."1 The agitation of the accused is
keen enough without imposing upon him the additional burden of a
psychological torture not unlike the third degree.3 2 It is unjust to demand
(broadcast of murder trial); Earle C. Anthony, Inc. v. Morrison, 83 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.
Cal. 1948), aff'd, mem., 173 F. 2d 897, case 2 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 819
(1949) (broadcast of murder trial); Ex Parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 AUt. 312 (1927)
(photographs during murder trial); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp.
957 (D. Minn. 1948) (photographs during divorce proceedings); High v. State, 197 Ark.
681, 12 S.W.2d 24 (1938) (photographs during manslaughter trial). Motion pictures
were taken of the Nuremberg trials. Taylor, The Issue Is Not TV, But FairPlay, 12 FED.
Com. B. J. 10, 14 (1951). Probably the most disgraceful illustration of the abnormal
coverage which can be given to a trial is the Bruno Hauptmann case. During the course of
the proceedings there were present "141 newspaper reporters and photographers, 125
telegraph operators and 40 messengers." Robbins, The Hauptmann Trial In the Light Of
English Criminal Procedure, 21 A.B.A. J. 301, 304 (1935). See also the remarks of
Senators Welker and Wiley on this subject in 97 CONO. REc. 9977, 9986 (August 10, 1951).
30 In the recent congressional committee investigations many of the witnesses, objecting
in part, to being televised read statements not unlike the following: "The presence of all
these lights, cameras, microphones and recording devices and all the other television and
radio and newsreel equipment subjects me to severe mental and physical strain so that I am
unable to think dearly; and, plus the heat generated by the lights and the general confusion,
makes this hearing as to me, a third degree." Washington Evening Star, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 4.
See also Hearings Before the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime, SEN. REP.
Nos. 208, 209, 82d Cong.; 1st Sess. pp. 3 and 5 (1951). The latter Reports accompanied
Senate Resolutions 119 and 120 which cited two individuals for contempt for refusing to
testify before the Kefauver Committee unless the television, radio and newsreel apparatus was
removed.
31 Ex Parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312, 314 (1927).
32 Mr. Klots writing in Harper's Magazine draws a graphic picture of the psychological
torment in which the accused is placed when testifying under the gaze of television:
First of all, the witness suffers a psychological ordeal which must make it impossible
for him to give accurate and careful testimony, however disposed he may be to do so.
Many of us suffer stage fright when merely confronted with a microphone. As for
television, few of us are movie stars. The very thought that millions of people are
watching and observing every expression and gesture would induce in many of us a
state of panic. Everyone is naturally at a disadvantage on the witness stand and

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 3 7

of an accused standing trial that he respond and be expected to be
judged on his response when his composure is so taxed and he is unable
to appear to the best of his ability.
These are the fundamental reasons for disallowing telecasts of trials.
In addition there are still others which, though not to the core of this
objectionable practice, well serve to illustrate its potential evils. First,
there is a possible danger in tie fact that the proceedings may be only
intermittently viewed by the public. A fair impression of the progress
of a trial cannot be obtained from excerpts. Such a view of the proceedings may create a distorted picture in the eyes of the viewers and while
misconceptions of trials and trial practice are not unusual in press
reporting that is little justification for compounding the distortions by
the use of television. Also, of newspaper reporting of trials it should be
remembered that the more responsible journals report and edit court
proceedings with a laudable restraint and understanding which only
seasoned reporters can contribute. In a telecast, the camera is the allpowerful weapon with only limited editing and interpreting opportunities
available, with the result that often truth, lies and suspicion in a jumbled
mass, with nothing sifted and nothing proved, are flashed across the
screen. The effect of intermittent viewing of such a presentation may
well be a "distorted impression of the facts [with the] consequent prejudgment of the witness by the viewers without regard to the legal
presumption of innocence to which the witness is entitled.""3
Secondly, it has been suggested that a telecast or broadcast of a trial
will encourage so many persons to form an opinion on the issues that it
would become difficult to select an impartial jury in the event that the
first trial did not reach a verdict. 4 While this objection has as yet not
reached the stature of gravity which it might, there lies within it another
automatically becomes self-conscious and easily confused. When we add the heat and
glare of klieg lights, cameras, microphones, and all the other paraphernalia that usually
go with television and radio broadcasting, the experience becomes for most people a
species of torture. Indeed it is much too close to the familiar methods that totalitarian
rulers use to elicit "facts." The analogy is an ugly one but it is inescapable. In most
instances the embarrassment and confusion which confound the witness in such surroundings contribute not to the search for truth but to a distorted and wholly inaccurate picture.
203 Harpers 90, 91 (October 1951).
33 REPORT OF SPECIAL COia=T-rEE OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION oN TELEVISING AND

BROADCASTING LEGIsLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 5 (February 11, 1952); Taylor,
The Issue Is Not TV, But Fair Play, 12 FED. Com. B.J. 10 (1951).
34 Compare Note, 17 ORE. L. R v. 139 (1938) with Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 67
A. 2d 497 (Md. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1949), noted in 63 HAmv. L. REV. 840
(1950).
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time-consuming obstruction to prevent a speedy disposition of a trial.
Finally, there is the possibility of commercial sponsors for televised trials.
With the commercial exploitation of congressional investigations a
reality,3 5 a sponsored telecast of a trial can readily be envisioned. To
portions of any community nothing is as appealing as an opportunity for
observing the enactment of a living drama, especially if evidence of
human depravity is to be revealed. An essaying commercial sponsor is
not likely to overlook an event with such a matchless dramatic appeal.
To the balance of any community such a state of events would constitute
a frontal assault on the principles of fair play for not only is the accused
unnecessarily made a spectacle of, but under the gracious auspices of an
often not too savory household product he is transformed into an involuntary actor and the court into a prop or setting hardly consonant with
its dignity or purpose.
Despite the many compelling reasons for disallowing a telecast of a
trial, unless the court exercises its discretion in favor of disallowance, the
accused may be helpless to protect himself. It is true that he is graced
with a presumption of innocence, but, as already indicated, this presumption may be debilitated when the proceedings are intermittently
viewed. The right to privacy, which in recent years has taken on an
aura of respectability not previously accorded it, affords him little
comfort.
Even if it is assumed that the right to privacy is impliedly recognized
within the provisions of the Constitution protecting against unreasonable
searches and seizures or against the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law," the accused's right still yields to the dominant right of
the public to information on matters of legitimate public or general
interest. 3 7 Trials and the activities of persons involved in trials are
considered such legitimate subjects of public interest and thus persons
who, even unwillingly come into the public eye as a result of the publi35

97 CoxG. REC. 10010 (August 10, 1951);

See Magazine 28 (November, 1951);

127

Colliers 86 April 28, 1951) ; 60 U.S. News & World Report 60 (March 30, 1951).
36 Compare Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922) where a majority
of the Supreme Court said: "Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision
of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restriction about
'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence'; nor, we may add, does it confer any right of
privacy upon either persons or corporations," with Pasevich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905) ; Warren and Brandeis, The Right of PrivaCy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193, 220 (1890), and the more recent Supreme Court decisions annotated in 14 A. L. R.
2d 750, 755 (1950) and 138 A.L. R. 22, 30 (1942).
37 Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MicH. L. REv. 526 (1941); RESTATEMMNT, TORTS §
867, comment c (1939).
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cized criminal prosecution, are deprived to a certain extent of their right
8
to be let alone
There is a rather unusual instance where the right to privacy has been
successfully invoked in a somewhat parallel situation. It appears in that
unique authority which recognizes to a limited extent at least, that the
customary photographing of a person for the purposes of police records
constitutes an invasion of the prisoner's right to privacy. 9 By accepting
this expression, perhaps it then may be successfully argued, in some
jurisdictions at least, that if constituted authority can be restrained to
the limited publication of an accused's photograph," then the telecasters
with their limitless scope of publication but with the absence of the
urgency and necessity upon which police powers are often based, would
have even a lesser right, if any, to photograph the accused against his
will. But generally, the right of privacy would indeed be a weak reed
to rely upon to prevent a telecast or broadcast of a trial. 1
Even though the adverse consequences of excessive publicity for
judicial proceedings may be apparent and even though it is clear that
during a trial the accused is temporarily rendered unable to protect his
own interests from a prying press, nevertheless the courts on occasion
have exercised their discretion in favor of telecasts or broadcasts of
trials.
3S Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D. C. Cir. 1945); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250,
37 So.2d 118 (1948) ; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Note, 15
Mo. L. Ray. 48 (1950). But see Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Cal.
1939) and the criticism of that case in MOSER & LAViNE, RADIO AND T=E LAW 108 (1947).
39 Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905), aff'd, 117 La. 708, 42 So.
228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906). This proposition
was also considered in McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A. 2d 514 (1945); aff'd,
137 N.J.Eq. 548, 45 A. 2d 842 (1946), complaint dismissed on final rehearing, 140 N.J.Eq.
341, 54 A. 2d 469 (1947) ; and Gow v. Bingham, 57 Misc. 66, 107 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1907).
40 State v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W. 2d 834 (1941); Downs v. Swann, Ill Md.
53, 73 At. 653 (1909) ; 1 TiFaoaarm , STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY
158, 159 (1900).
41 Elmhurst v. Shoreham Hotel, et al., 58F. Supp. 484 (D.C. 1945), aff'd, 153 F. 2d 467
(D. C. Cir. 1945) ; and Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948), noted in 22 So. CALar. L. REV. 320 (1949), and 15 Mo. L. REv. 104 (1950); 41
A.m. JuR. § 26, p. 64 (1951).
There may be some prospect for relief in the argument that if a trial is commercially
sponsored the telecasters are in effect transmitting the features of the accused, in his
plight, for advertising or trade purposes. By so doing it would seem that the telecasters
pass beyond their principal function as purveyors of information of matters of public
interest and to that extent the accused's right of privacy may be revived. Compare Feinberg,
Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 CoL. L. REv. 713, 720 (1948).
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While there is apparently no right to televise a trial, 42 a telecast of a
trial would not be unlawful 'per se. The Supreme Court of Oregon had
an early opportunity to pronounce on this proposition in Irnin v.
Ashurst. There the court, in dealing with a broadcast of a murder trial
which the trial court and counsel had consented to, made this observation:
Undoubtedly there is a diversity of opinion as to the propriety of installing a microphone in the courtroom for the purpose of broadcasting judicial
proceedings, especially in cases involving sordid details of crime. This
court is not prepared to say that it is unlawful per se to install a microphone in a courtroom to report judicial proceedings. The American Bar
Association frowns upon such practice. It is a matter for the determination
of the trial judge.43
To the accused it is little consolation to learn that although the procedure
of broadcasting and televising trials may be discountenanced by the
American Bar Association this perverse practice continues to exist.
It seems obvious that more than ethical censure is now required to curb
a practice which infringes on the basic rights of accused individuals. 4
There must be a condemnation breeding the extinction of this practice
if the accused is to be assured the full protection of his constitutional
right to fair play.
The opinion in Irwin v. Ashurst provides the accused with no
reassurance that his personal sensibilities will be shielded. However, there
is some evidence justifying an expectation that judicial discretion may be
invoked to exclude television cameras and broadcasting equipment from
courtrooms. In Ex parte Sturm, the Maryland court, in a well reasoned
decision, grappled with the issue of whether a court could prohibit the
42 Earle C. Anthony, Inc. v. Morrison, 83 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, mem.,
173 F.2d 897, Case 2 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denkd, 338 U.S. 819 (1949).
43 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127, 1130 (1938).
Although the dissenting judges opinion is
not reported, his view was that the broadcasting of trials should be condemned as an
unethical practice. Note, 36 MicH. L. Rnv. 1397, 1401 (1938). See also Note, 36 ICH. L.
REV. 1386 (1938).
The disfavor of the American Bar Association alluded to by the court is expressed in
Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which provides:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The
taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses between
sessions and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the
essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with
respect thereto, in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
The Special Committee of the American Bar Asssociation on Televising and Broadcasting
Legislative and Judicial Proceedings has recommended that this Canon be amended to
include a provision prohibiting a telecast of trials.
44 The American Bar Association Committee (supra note 43) in its report recommended
that if Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics was not observed "we would favor
buttressing it by legislation." February 11, 1952, p. 12.
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use of cameras in a courtroom during the progress of a trial. The court
in dismissing an appeal from a contempt judgment said:
The challenge in this case of the court's right to forbid the use of
cameras in the courtroom during the progress of the trial presents an
issue of vital importance. If such a right should yield to an asserted privilege of the press, the authority and dignity of the courts would be seriously
impaired. It is essential to the integrity and independence of judicial tribunals that they shall have the power to enforce their own judgment as
to what conduct is incompatible with the proper and orderly course of
their procedure. If their discretion should be subordinated to that of a
newspaper manager in regard to the use of photographic instruments in
the courtroom, it would be difficult to limit the further reduction to which
the authority of the courts would be exposed. It would be utterly inconsistent with the position and prerogatives of the judiciary, as a co-ordinate
branch of government, to require its submission to the judgment of a
non-governmental agency as to a question of proper conduct in the judicial
forums."
There are, of course, legitimate boundaries of operation within which
the courts and the press can function without friction. The preservation
and publication of criminal statistics are to a certain extent desirable.
When the press performs this service with an objective bent it satisfies
its function and duty, but when it exceeds this service and subordinates
objectivity it begins to poach on the exclusive province of the courts
and its conduct must be made to conform to a dignity compatible with
the proper and orderly administration of the law. Conformity not only
can and should be demanded of the press and its media, but it is suggested that when television apparatus is utilized to transmit a running
account of a trial telecasters are divested of the protective shroud of the
First Amendment and lay themselves open not only to a possible right
in the accused to restrain the telecast, but also to the necessity of conformity, for they are then bereft of whatever advantages their purported
privilege of the press might otherwise have conferred upon them. A
distinctive feature of television is its ability to convey an instantaneous
and continuing account of an event. There is however some indication
"that a running account of an event is not news even though the result
45 152 Md. 114, 136 AtI. 312, 316 (1927); 51 A.L.R. 356 (1927). The trial court in
an opening statement said (id. at 116, 136 Atl. at 313):
In my judgment it is not compatible with judicial dignity for the dignity of the
administration of the law, to allow the courtroom to be used, or the precincts of the
court, for the taking of any photographs for moving pictures or the press or any other

agency....°
For a different appreciation for the relationship between the court and the press see
Ex Parte Foster, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 423, 426, 71 S.W. 593, 595 (1903), Note, 159 A.L.R.

1379, 1392 (1945).
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of the event may be.' 46 Applying this conclusion to the instance of a
televised trial, it may well be that the accused as well as the court could
restrain the telecast without fear of infringing on the freedom of the
press.
However much the practice of televising trials may be impugned and
however much the adverse consequences of such a procedure are pressed,
the disturbing disparity in the Irwin and Sturm decisions prevails. That
trial courts have and will continue to differ on a matter so essential to
a fair trial patently illustrates the necessity for mandatory and uncontradicted guidance. There is thus a need for judicial or legislative reprobation in the form of rules or statutes which will prohibit television
cameras, microphones and similar recording or sound registering devices
from being operated in or about the courtrooms. Unless the courts are
armed with such a mandate they will fall prey to the fear of judicial
infringement of the freedom of the press. For, however strongly they
may feel about the disturbing presence of television and broadcasting
apparatus they will necessarily proceed cautiously before attempting to
sit as censors and to interfere with what is said to be the traditional right
of the press to print all the printable news which appears in the public
records of the courts.'
The courts are consequently left in a dilemma, the solution to which
they themselves must devise without the aid of impelling precedent.
In the absence of a governing rule or statute, the state courts might
extricate themselves by assimilating Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. This technique was proposed in Bisignano v.
Municipal Court of Des Moines.4 In that action the petitioner, seeking
review of a contempt proceeding, complained that his constitutional
rights had been violated by reason of the wiring of the courtroom and
subsequent broadcast of the contempt proceedings. While the court did
not feel that petitioner's constitutional rights were involved, it disapproved of this form of publicity for court proceedings and said:
Rule 53 of the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the
taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio
broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. It is a rule that
every court should follow whether federal or otherwise, and in either
criminal or civil proceedings.49 (Emphasis added.)

46 Solinger, Unauthorized Uses of Telecasts, 48 CoL. L. REv. 847, 858 (1948).
47 Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948);

Note, 14
48 237
49 Id.
(1951) )

A.L.R.2d 750, 754 (1950).
Ia. 895, 23 N.W. 2d 523 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 818 (1946).
at 532. Federal Rule 53 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 U.S. C. A. 35
was apparently the result of a number of legal articles and Bar Committee reports
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But again in the absence of a governing rule or statute the court may
feel inadequately equipped to undertake the exclusion of an officious
press. And this was the court's attitude in Berg v. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., 0 wherein a motion for summary judgment was granted the
defendant in an action where the defendant, despite plaintiff's protests
had published a photograph of the plaintiff taken in the courtroom during
a divorce and custody proceeding. The court there stated:
The impertinence of newspaper photographers in taking pictures of
persons involved in court proceedings when they are in the courtroom or
court buildings may well be condemned as a nuisance and often constitutes
an unwarranted interference with the orderly functioning of our courts,6 1
but the curbing of such practices must rest with the courts by appropriate
rule which will tend to limit such activities, or by the enactment of legislation which might place some reasonable limits upon the assumed
privileges of newspaper photographers under such circumstances. 2
More than a decade has passed since the IrWn and Sturm cases
focused attention on the courts' predicament and the attempted dilution
of its authority to exclusively control the conduct of judicial proceedings.
Since then a new medium has been introduced to vex the accused and
to amplify the problems, but the legislatures have been slow to respond
to the needs of the court and the accused. In some courts, rules forbidding the broadcasting of court proceedings have been adopted.53 Until
the very recent past in only two states, Wisconsin and Georgia, had legislative action been taken to prohibit the broadcasting of trials6 4 Of these
the Wisconsin statute was the broadest in application, providing:
dealing with the problem of courtroom photographs and radio broadcasts. The basic
objections urged were that such court procedure would sensationalize scandals; reduce
trials to theatrical performances lessening respect for the law and its instrumentalities;
formulate public opinion on matters to be judged by juries alone; and subject litigants to
unnecessary humiliation.
50 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948).
-51 The court in In Re Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y. Supp. 615 (1931), a contempt
action, felt that a reporter's use of an explosive flash bulb while photographing, in the
courthouse, prisoners being conducted into a courtroom, disturbed the functioning of the
court.
52 79 F. Supp. 957, 962 (D. Minn. 1948).
53 A number of the Federal District Courts, by rule, prohibit the broadcasting of
court proceedings. 10 FED. CoM. B.J. 20 n. 3 (1949).
In Pennsylvania, Rule 223(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court
provides:
During the trial of actions the court shall prohibit the taking of photographs and
motion pictures in the courtroom and the transmission of communications by telegraph,
telephone or radio in or from the courtroom.
See also in New York the Special Rules of the Appellate Division Rules-First and Second
Departments; Special Rules of the Appellate Term Rules-First Department, and the various
Supreme Court Rules.
54 GA. LAws, Act No. 136 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 348.61 (1949).
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Any person who shall either directly from the courtroom or by means
of any recorded transcription made in the courtroom, broadcast by radio
or any like means of disseminating information all or any part of the
proceedings in any criminal trial or examination in this state purporting
to be the actual voices of witnesses, counsel or judge, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor. No court or judge shall permit the making of any such
recorded transcription for the purpose of broadcasting the same. 5
In New York, a bill introduced by Senator Helman and enacted during

the current legislative session makes a broadcast or telecast of any trial
or proceeding in any court organized under the laws of New'York,
whether of record or not of record, a misdemeanor.5 6

Perhaps these enactments and introductory measures presage similar
action in other jurisdictions. Nothing could be more commendable or

more consistent with our comprehension of the idea of fair play. The
televising and broadcasting of trials makes less possible a dispassionate
determination and presentation of the issues before the court. It is a

practice, incompatible with the dignity of the courts, which casts disrespect on the processes of judicial administration and unnecessarily
intensifies the emotional apprehension and humiliation of the witnesses
and parties. The best interests of the courts, the accused and the public
generally, demand the enactment of appropriate legislation or court rule
thoughout the various states. By such action only can the integrity of
courts in conducting trials and the rights of accused persons during trials

best be preserved. Whatever majesty and decency remains to the administration of the law should be conserved and not destroyed by resorting
to television, the latest counterpart of the Roman circus-without lions.5"
55 Wis. STAT. § 348.61 (1949). The Georgia Act provides:

The Recorder of the Police Court of the City of Savannah shall not permit radio
broadcasts of the proceedings of said court to be made at any time when said court is
in session; nor shall he permit any records, wire or tape recordings made of the proceedings and/or hearings of said court for the purpose of making public radio broadcasts of said proceedings. (Georgia Laws, 1949, Act. No. 136, p. 545.)
A person violating this act is deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
56 This bill amends the Civil Rights Law by adding a new section fifty-two which reads
as follows:
§ 52. Televising, broadcasting or taking motion pictures of certain proceedings
prohibited. No person, firm, association or corporation shall televise, broadcast, take
motion pictures or arrange for the televising, broadcasting, or taking of motion pictures
within this state of proceedings, in which the testimony of witnesses by subpoena or
other compulsory process is or may be taken, conducted by a court, commission, committee, administrative agency or other tribunal in this state.
Any violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor. Naw YoRK LAws of 1952, c. 241.
57 The Detroit News, April 1, 1951, p. 15, col. 1.

